Render Outage History

### Summary On October 14, 2026, between 12:12 and 15:08 PDT \(19:12 - 22:08 UTC\), builds and deploys across all regions failed to start, stalled, or were significantly delayed during two periods of impact totaling about 2 hours and 20 minutes. The cause was a database schema migration run as part of a planned version upgrade of our internal job scheduler that coordinates builds, deploys, and other critical platform operations. The migration led to high load and a longer-than-expected recovery time of this system’s database. We will change how we perform upgrades and modifications of this system in a highly available fashion in the future so that a similar change cannot cause an outage again. ### Impact There were two periods of impact. During this time, live user services were not affected, but builds and deploys across all regions failed to start, failed to finish, or were significantly delayed. **Period 1: 12:12 - 12:40 PDT \(19:12 - 19:40 UTC\), about 28 minutes** * New builds and deploys did not start. Deploys in progress stalled. * Some requests to create a deploy through the Dashboard, API, and CLI returned errors \(HTTP 500\). **Partial recovery: 12:40 - 13:18 PDT \(19:40 - 20:18 UTC\)** * Builds and deploys ran, but deploys took about 20 seconds to start instead of a few hundred milliseconds. **Period 2: 13:18 - 15:08 PDT \(20:18 - 22:08 UTC\), about 1 hour 50 minutes** * Builds and deploys were delayed, stalled in progress \(including in pre-deploy\), or failed. From 13:51 PDT, almost no new builds were able to start. * Some queued deploys did not start after recovery, and cancelling them through the API had no effect. Users needed to retry these deploys. ### Root Cause Render uses an internal job scheduler system to coordinate builds, deploys, and other critical platform operations. We were rolling out improvements to how it distributes work, and began a planned version upgrade of this system in production after a successful practice run in a test environment. The upgrade included a database schema migration that locked a large table and drove database CPU utilization to 100%. This database stores both the system’s core job state and secondary data used for search and reporting. The system could not read or write job state reliably, so builds and deploys stopped or slowed. Engineers were alerted to the issue quickly and reverted the upgrade. However, three factors extended the impact: * A pre-upgrade step to create a database clone for rollback could not be completed due to an error from the underlying cloud provider, so a fast rollback was not available. * The migration continued to run on the database after the client performing the upgrade was stopped and the upgrade reverted. It was found and terminated at 13:49 PDT, about 1.5 hours after it started. * An attempt to add capacity to the database failed due to an error from the underlying cloud provider. ### Timeline All times are PDT on 2026-10-14 \(UTC-7\). * **12:13** - The upgrade is started, including the database schema migration. Database load rises and builds and deploys stop starting. * **12:24** - Impact to builds and deploys identified. Incident escalated. * **12:33** - Status page incident opened. * **12:34** - Engineers revert the upgrade and stop the client performing the schema migration. * **12:37** - Job scheduler system recovers. Builds and deploys resume, with slower deploy start times. End of Period 1. * **13:17** - Engineers restart one unhealthy instance of the system to rebalance load. Database connections and errors increase across the system. Start of Period 2. * **13:37** - Free-tier deploys paused to reduce load. * **13:49** - Engineers find the schema migration still running on the database and terminate it. * **14:16** - Database restarted. An attempt to add database capacity fails because of an error from the underlying cloud provider. * **14:27** - Remaining components of the system restarted. * **14:30** - Builds and deploys start to recover, with slower than usual build and deploy times as the backlog is processed. * **15:08** - Deploy start times return to normal and database load returns to pre-incident levels. End of Period 2. * **15:11** - Free-tier deploys and spin-ups gradually re-enabled. * **15:18** - Incident resolved. ### Mitigations **Completed during the incident** * Reverted the job scheduler component upgrade and configuration change \(12:34 PDT\). * Paused free-tier deploys and spin-ups to reduce load, then re-enabled them gradually after recovery. * Terminated the schema migration that was still running on the database \(13:49 PDT\). * Restarted the database and the job scheduler system to restore normal operation. * Paused the upgrade in production until the upgrade process is changed. **Ongoing \(started during the incident\)** * This database is being upgraded to support cross-zone High Availability. **Planned** * Implement a new upgrade and deployment practice for this component: we will implement blue-green deploys to avoid upgrading this system under load in the future. * Adjust the underlying storage mechanisms for the job scheduler to be better suited to this workload type, after we have implemented blue-green deploys.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented, and we are monitoring the results. Deploys and builds for services running on free instances continue to be paused.

Builds are failing to start again across all regions, and our team is still working to address the root cause. Deploys for free services remain paused. We'll share another update as soon as we have more information.

The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

We are temporarily pausing deploys to free services.

We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

We are currently investigating this issue.

Builds and deploys failed for a subset of services in Oregon. Services using a prebuilt Docker image and static sites were unaffected.

We are currently investigating this issue.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

We are currently investigating this issue.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

Inbound traffic to Singapore services is impacted. Free service spin-ups (from idle) in Singapore have been temporarily disabled while we continue to investigate.

We've observed that deploys are primarily affected by this.

We are investigating service instability affecting some web services in our Singapore region. Customers may experience unexpected service restarts or intermittent availability. Our team is actively investigating and working to restore normal operation. We will provide an update as more information becomes available.

This incident has been resolved.

We have observed full recovery. We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

We are observing recovery for builds and deploys in all regions. Builds, deploys, and spin-up for free web services have been re-enabled. Some customers may continue to see elevated latency while recovery progresses. We are continuing to monitor.

An issue has been identified with our upstream provider, Google Cloud. Free Web Services: Builds/deploys and spin-up have been temporarily disabled while we work to mitigate the issue.

We are currently investigating this issue.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

Some users enrolled in 2FA report login loops when attempting to access the Render dashboard. We're investigating.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

This incident has been resolved.

We're seeing signs of recovery. Please try redeploying any affected services.

We are currently investigating this issue.

Outstanding emails have been sent and processing has returned to expected operation.

Our provider has resolved the delay and backlogged emails are being processed. We're continuing to monitor.

Our email provider is experiencing delays in sending emails. Emails will still be delivered after that delay. This impacts verification emails and notifications for workspaces or services. We're monitoring the situation.

We are currently investigating this issue.

This incident has been resolved.

We're seeing recovery and are monitoring.

We are currently investigating this issue. It affects metrics only. Logs are unaffected.

Our upstream provider has resolved the issue and custom domain provisioning has recovered.

Our upstream provider has deployed a fix and we're seeing gradual recovery.

We are currently investigating this issue.

Between approximately 19:45 UTC and 20:30 UTC, logs may be unavailable in the Dashboard. For logs that are unavailable, logs were not streamed to third-party logging providers.

Let's Encrypt has resumed certificate issuance.

Due to an ongoing incident, Let's Encrypt has paused all certificate issuance. This primarily impacts wildcard domains on Render. In rare instances, non-wildcard custom domains may be using Let's Encrypt for their certificates.

Everything is back to normal, and the incident is now resolved. We are planning long-term mitigations to prevent this issue from recurring, and we will share the results of our investigation with all affected customers.

All affected instances are back online, though a few databases may still show a stale 'Unready' status. We are working to refresh the status.

We're continuing to see instance recovery across the fleet. Render Workflows is now fully operational.

We're bringing the affected Postgres instances back online and expect full recovery within fifteen minutes.

We've identified the issue and are implementing a fix.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

We're investigating reports of Postgres unavailability in multiple regions. At this point we believe this only impacts databases with HA turned on.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

This incident has been resolved.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

We are seeing image pull failures within the Oregon region. We have identified the problem and are working on a fix.

We've confirmed that our fix has addressed the issue and workloads are now scheduling normally in all regions.

Provisioning is recovering for free and paid services across all regions. Free services have resumed serving traffic. We are continuing to monitor for further issues.

Paid services are continuing to see recovery across builds and deploys. Free services remain disabled and will return errors if loaded in a browser. Singapore and part of Oregon remain impacted.

We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

We are disabling new free services in Singapore and partially in Oregon.

We're seeing recovery across all regions.

We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

We are now seeing the same issue affecting services in Oregon partially. We are investigating to remediate this as quickly as possible.

Services with paid compute should now be operating normally. Please note that free services in this region are still intermittently disabled.

We are continuing to investigate this issue.

We are seeing some recovery following our mitigation efforts, but we are still working to identify the root cause for a long-term resolution.

We have temporarily disabled free services in Singapore. We are continuing to investigate and work to mitigate the issue.

This issue may affect new instances during builds, scaling, and similar operations. You may experience build/deploy failures. We are still investigating.