Is Bitbucket Down?

On 06 March 2026 UTC, Bitbucket experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

On January 28, 2026, affected Bitbucket Cloud users in eu-west-1 may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

### Summary On Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, Atlassian customers using Bitbucket Cloud could not load the dashboard landing page. Users also faced degraded performance and intermittent failures navigating other parts of the application or using public REST APIs. The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API, causing long-running queries on a database which resulted in failed web and api requests. The incident was detected within three minutes by automated monitoring systems and mitigated by introducing stricter limits on the API for certain traffic, while taking manual actions on the impacted database, restoring Bitbucket to a healthy state. ### **IMPACT** Occurring on Bitbucket Cloud on Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, the incident caused degraded performance and intermittent failures to a subset of customers interacting with the Bitbucket web application and public APIs. Git operations over SSH and HTTPS were not impacted. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API. The request volume during this period resulted in high resource utilization our central database’s read replicas, impacting website and our API performance and reliability. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages reduce your productivity. Although we have several testing and prevention processes, this issue went undetected because a specific request pattern on a public API was not tested against the traffic volume seen during the incident. We prioritized the following actions to prevent repeating this type of incident: * Improve rate limiting and caching capabilities at multiple points in our networking and application layers. * Apply stricter rate limits for specific public APIs to protect infrastructure health and shared application resources. * Optimize performance of specific queries and codepaths on these APIs to handle high request loads. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We have successfully mitigated the incident and the affected service is now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.

### Summary On **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available. The issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian’s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions. All impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began. ### IMPACT During the impact window, customers experienced: * **Outbound product email failures** \(notifications and other product emails did not send\). * **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \(e.g. sign‑ups, password resets, one‑time‑password / step‑up challenges\). * **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications** * **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by: 1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal. 2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers’ ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites. We are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes: * **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure** * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry. * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline. * **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows** We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations. We apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support